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Attention to
Unseen Objects
Abstract: Can one pay attention to objects without being conscious of
them? Some years ago there was evidence that had been taken to show
that the answer is ‘yes’. That evidence was inconclusive, but there is
recent work that makes the case more compellingly: it now seems that
it is indeed possible to pay attention to objects of which one is not con-
scious. This is bad news for theories in which the connection between
attention and consciousness is taken to be an essential one. It is good
news for theories (including mine) in which the connection between
attention and agency is taken to be essential.
1. A Point of Contention
According to one view of consciousness, and of its relationship to
attention, a conscious person will normally be conscious of several
different things. Some proper subset of these things can be phenom-
enally foregrounded and cognitively prioritized. The things in that
subset will, in virtue of this foregrounding and prioritization, be the
things to which that person is paying attention. Such a view entails
that unconscious attention is an impossibility, on a par with the impos-
sibility of being the star without appearing in the show. Attention,
according to this view, just is the foregrounding and prioritization of
consciousness.
In a 2008 article I suggested (1) that this view of the relationship
between attention and consciousness is quite a natural one, and (2)
that the evidence that had been taken to refute it did not do so (Mole,
2008a). Both claims have come under attack in the subsequent litera-
ture: evidence has been adduced to show that this view is not as
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natural as I had supposed (de Brigard, 2010), and to show that the
view is not as defensible as I had suggested (Kentridge, de-Wit and
Heywood, 2008; Koch and Tsuchiya, 2008). The present article is
concerned with the second of these points. It explains that there are
now reasons for giving up the claim that I once thought natural. It then
considers the philosophical repercussions of doing so.
The claim that is at issue might be thought of as the claim that con-
sciousness is necessary for attention. That would not be an inaccurate
way to think of it, but — because of the ambiguity between ‘creature
consciousness’ and ‘state consciousness’ (Rosenthal, 1986; White,
1964) — I do not think that it is sufficiently precise. The claim at issue
is better formulated as follows:
For all persons and all things, if the person is attending to
the thing then the person is conscious of that thing.
This formulation was referred to, in my earlier treatment, as ‘’. It
will be convenient to continue with that convention here.
If  were true then the things to which one is paying attention
would be a subset of the things of which one is conscious. The door
would then be open to the pursuit of a consciousness-first strategy,
when one is giving an explanation of attention. One could start with
consciousness — supposing it to be explained elsewhere — and could
explain what attention is by specifying how some proper subset of the
conscious field comes to be foregrounded, so that it qualifies as a
locus of attention.
If  turned out to be false, on the other hand, then any such strategy
for the explanation of attention would no longer be satisfactory, since
it would fail to account for those instances of attention that occur
unconsciously. But, because of that, the door would then be open to
the pursuit of an attention-first strategy, when one is in the business of
explaining consciousness.
No more than one of these explanatory strategies can be viable.
Both have their advocates.
The consciousness-first strategy for explaining attention has been
adopted by Declan Smithies, and by Sebastian Watzl. Smithies has
suggested that the thing that needs to happen to consciousness, in
order for it to constitute attention, is for the contents of consciousness
to be available for ‘rational access’ (Smithies, 2011). Watzl has sug-
gested that consciousness comes to be attention-constituting when a
structure is imposed upon it in which some parts are, in a sense that he
tries to make precise, more peripheral than others (Watzl, 2011). Both
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treat attention as if it were a particular kind of consciousness. They
therefore require  to be true.
The contrary strategy — i.e. the attention-first strategy for explain-
ing consciousness — has been adopted by Jesse Prinz. It is pursued in
his 2012 book, The Conscious Brain (Prinz, 2012), and in a series of
associated articles (Prinz, 2010; 2011). According to Prinz’s ‘At-
tended Intermediate Representation’ theory (which he abbreviates to
‘AIR’), consciousness is what happens when attention is paid to stim-
uli that are represented in a certain ‘intermediate’ way. Prinz’s project
therefore depends on rejecting the claim that attention is just one par-
ticular variety of consciousness (since if it were then he would be
using one particular form of consciousness to explain consciousness
itself, and the resulting explanation would be circular). He must there-
fore reject the approach that Watzl and Smithies have taken.
My main business in the present article will be to review the most
impressive of the experiments that now provide evidence for the fal-
sity of . Such evidence is, for reasons that have already been indi-
cated, bad news for the explanatory project that has been pursued by
Smithies and Watzl. We shall be seeing that it is also unwelcome news
for Prinz’s project, as Prinz himself understands it.
In so far as there is good news here it will be good news for a theory
such as that advocated by Wayne Wu (2011) — or, indeed, by me
(Mole, 2005; 2011). According to these theories attention is not essen-
tially related to consciousness (although it might nonetheless be
essentially related to psychological processes in which consciousness
is normally, but contingently, involved). In these theories attention is
understood as being essentially related, not to consciousness, but to
agency, broadly construed. I conclude with some remarks on the sig-
nificance of this.
2. Evidence Against 
If  were true then it would be impossible to attend to a thing without
being conscious of that thing. The empirical case against  comes
from evidence that this is not impossible, since there are actual cases
of it.
The clearest of these cases seemed, back in 2008, to be the case of a
blindsight patient, GY (described in Barbur, Ruddock and Waterfield,
1980). A series of experiments by Robert Kentridge, Charles Hey-
wood, and their collaborators had found GY to be capable of selec-
tively attending to locations that fall within the blind part of his visual
field (Kentridge, Heywood and Weiskrantz, 2004; Kentridge, Nijboer
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and Heywood, 2008; Kentridge and Heywood, 2001). That was an
important finding to have made, but several philosophers and psy-
chologists were too quick to suppose that it provided a clear counter-
example to a claim like . Although Kentridge and Heywood’s
experiments show that GY can differentially direct his attention to dif-
ferent parts of the space that falls within the blind part of his visual
field, it is not clear that their experiments show GY to be directing his
attention to the unseen objects that are located in those parts of space.
GY is not conscious of the objects that are presented on his right hand
side, but he may not be able to pay attention to those objects. It may
simply be that, when he focuses his attention on the parts of space in
which the objects happen to occur, his processing of information per-
taining to those objects is facilitated. If this is the correct description
of GY’s attention to his blindfield then he is not a counter-example to
.
This alternative characterization of GY’s attention depends on the
drawing of a distinction between attending to an object and attending
to the space within which that object occurs. The tenability of such a
distinction is at the crux of the current discussion. The distinction is a
particularly difficult one to operationalize in the case of the blind-
sighter. It is partly as a result of this difficulty that the empirical case
against  has moved, in the more recent literature, away from the con-
sideration of unconscious attention in blindsight, and towards the con-
sideration of unconscious attention in the normal population.
The move from considering a blindsight patient to considering normal
subjects brings with it the need to contrive special stimuli, of a sort
that can be presented while subjects remain unconscious of them. Psy-
chologists have a well-established repertoire of tricks for creating
such stimuli, but the attempt to demonstrate attention in the absence of
consciousness has led to a new trick being developed. This trick —
which was first used in a 2013 paper by Liam Norman, Charles Hey-
wood, and Robert Kentridge — depends on presenting one’s experi-
mental participants with shapes such as the rectangles in Figure 1, the
edges of which are defined purely by contrasts of visual texture.
In the experiment that first used this trick, Norman, Heywood and
Kentridge’s (2013) participants were presented with a screen showing
a grid that was filled with Gabor patches (except that sixteen evenly
spaced cells of the grid were empty). The Gabor patches could be ori-
ented vertically or horizontally, and this difference between the orien-
tation of the patches was used to define two rectangles, as it does in
Figure 1.
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The clever part of Norman, Kentridge and Heywood’s trick is that, if
all of the vertical patches switch to being horizontal, and all of the hor-
izontal patches switch to being vertical — and if they do this switch-
ing back and forth at the rate of one switch every 30 ms, then the
patches all become a blur. The result is that the rectangles become
completely invisible: when subjects are given a signal-detection task,
and are asked to make a guess about whether the rectangles are present
or absent, their guesses contain no information about whether the rect-
angles are there or not.
Norman, Heywood and Kentridge’s remarkable discovery — the
details of which we shall be considering shortly — is that the partici-
pants in this experiment can be prompted to pay attention not only to
the parts of the screen on which these invisible rectangles occur, but to
the invisible rectangles themselves. It is this that shows, contrary to
my own earlier suggestion (Mole, 2008a,b), that claim  must be mis-
taken. Norman, Heywood and Kentridge’s (2013) experiment shows
that it is possible to attend to a thing without being conscious of it.
In order to show that the participants in this experiment are directing
their attention to the invisible rectangles themselves, and not merely
to the space in which those rectangles occur, Norman, Heywood and
Kentridge depend on a variation of the same-object advantage. It is
worth reminding ourselves of what this is, since it is the same-object
advantage that enables us to operationalize the distinction between
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Figure 1. An example of one time slice of Norman, Heywood and
Kentridge’s stimuli. The two rectangles are defined purely by the orienta-
tion of the Gabor patches. Image kindly provided by Liam Norman.
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attention to locations and attention to the objects that fall within those
locations.
It should be uncontroversial that there is some such distinction to be
drawn. The claim that subject S is attending to region R, and the claim
that object O falls within region R, do not together imply that S was
attending to O. To show this, let O be something imperceptible, or
something that behaves in such a way as to elude attention (such as the
flowing stimuli used by van Marle and Scholl, in their 2003 paper).
Alternatively (and as I have suggested previously), let R be the retinal
blind spot, and O be a mark that falls wholly within it. In these cases
there can be attention to the location within which an object falls,
without the attentive subject thereby paying any attention to that
object. There must therefore be some distinction to be drawn between
attending to a location, and attending to an object in that location.
Some commentators have suggested that it is specious to take the
preceding argument as establishing anything more than a logical dis-
tinction between attention to objects and attention to locations (Koch
and Tsuchiya, 2008, p. 45). It must be admitted that our earlier discus-
sion required us to draw this distinction in what might seem to be an
especially problematic case. We wanted to distinguish between
attending to the things in a location and attending to the location of
those things even in GY’s case, in which paying attention to a location
facilitates the processing of information that pertains to the things in
that location. Here one might be tempted to complain that the drawing
of our distinction makes no difference. Even if there is a logical dis-
tinction between attending to a thing and attending to the part of space
containing that thing, it might be said that — in those cases where
attention is paid in such a way as to facilitate one’s processing of
information pertaining to the things in the space that has been attended
— there is no psychological distinction between attending to a thing
and attending to its part of space. It might then be said that the distinc-
tion between attention to locations and attention to the things in those
locations is worth drawing only when attention to a region of space
has no effect on the processing of information from the things that fall
into that region, so that we only really need this distinction when we
are considering exceptional regions, such as the retinal blind spot, or
exceptional things, to which attention cannot normally be paid.
There is something right about this line of complaint, and we shall
try to do justice to it in what follows, but in the form just given the
complaint clearly goes too far. Psychologists do need to distinguish
between attention to locations and attention to objects, even in the
normal case. The ‘same-object advantage’ shows why. It shows one
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way in which the attention to objects/attention to locations distinction
can be drawn, even for unexceptional regions and unexceptional
objects, and even when attention to a space does facilitate the process-
ing of objects that fall within it.
The existence of the same-object advantage was established in a
now-classic study, conducted by Robert Egly, Jon Driver and Robert
Rafal (1994). Egly, Driver and Rafal presented their participants with
a pair of rectangles like those shown in Figure 2. Unlike in the Nor-
man, Kentridge and Heywood (2013) experiment, there was nothing
special about these rectangles. They were defined by a light grey line
on a dark grey ground and were presented, sometimes vertically and
sometimes horizontally, for a period of seconds, on a screen that was
in clear view. Participants were instructed to fix their gaze on a mark
lying halfway between these rectangles, in the middle of the screen.
The experimenters then changed the colour of one end of one of the
rectangles for 100 ms, as an attention-directing cue. The participants
had to respond as quickly as possible to a square target stimulus,
which sometimes occurred and sometimes didn’t occur, 200 ms after
this attention-directing cue had been removed.
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Figure 2. A schematic representation of one trial in Egly, Driver and Rafal’s
demonstration of the same object advantage. When the top left location is
cued, reactions to targets in the top right are faster only if the bars are ori-
ented horizontally, so that the cue and the target locations fall within the
same object. The attention-grabbing cue therefore draws attention to the
object of which it is a part, and not merely to the location in which it occurs.
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In order to gauge the way in which the participants in this experiment
were paying attention, Egly, Driver and Rafal (1994) timed their reac-
tions to the target squares, on the assumption that the reaction times
would be quicker if the cue had directed the participants’ attention to
the location in which the target then appears, and would be slower if
that cue had directed their attention to a location other than the loca-
tion of the target.
The distance between the rectangles was, crucially, the same as the
distance from one end of a rectangle to the other: the location marked
‘A’, in Figure 2, is as far from the location marked ‘B’ as it is from the
location marked ‘C’. If the rectangles were oriented horizontally then
the two locations that would previously have fallen into the top (or
bottom) of two different rectangles now occurred at opposite ends of
the same rectangle. These stimuli therefore allowed Egly, Driver and
Rafal to distinguish between the effect of directing attention with a
cue that occurs near to the subsequent target, and the effect of direct-
ing attention with a cue that falls within the same visual object as that
target. By showing that a cue in one location draws attention to
another location only if the two locations fall within the same visual
object, their experiment reveals that a 100 ms cue does not simply pull
attention to the part of space that that cue occupies. Such a cue pulls
attention to the object of which it is a part. The same object advantage
therefore illustrates the distinction that we are interested in. The pres-
ence of this advantage indicates that attention is being paid to an
object, and not just to the space in which that object falls.
The point to notice here is that the same-object advantage gives
sense to the distinction between attention to objects and attention to
their locations, even in the case where the region in question is unex-
ceptional, where the objects are normal candidates for attention, and
where they are being processed in an attention-enhanced way. It is not
simply that the rectangles in Egly, Driver and Rafal’s experiment fall
within the attended area, nor is it simply that, in virtue of falling into
that area, the processing of information pertaining to those rectangles
is facilitated. Something more is true, which is that the rectangles
themselves define the location to which attention is allocated.
It is in this sense that Norman, Heywood and Kentridge’s (2013)
experiment shows that attention can be paid to rectangles that are
completely invisible. The participants in this experiment were sat in
front of a screen that they consciously experienced as if it were just an
undifferentiated grid of blurry, shimmering patches. Sixteen evenly
distributed locations within this grid were empty. One of these empty
locations would fill with a white disk for 160 ms. Another disk would
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then appear, immediately after this attention-directing cue had disap-
peared. It would either be in the same location as the cue, or else in
another of the empty cells in the grid. This second disk was either red
or green. The participants pressed a button to indicate its colour. Their
reaction times were measured.
The important trials in this paradigm are those in which the col-
oured disk appears in one of the uncued locations. By changing the
orientations and locations of their unseen rectangles, Norman, Hey-
wood and Kentridge (2013) could determine whether or not these
uncued target locations did or did not fall within the same rectangle as
the attention-directing cue, and they could do this without changing
the locations of (or distances between) the targets and the cues. They
could therefore arrange for the cue and the target to fall in the same or
in different rectangles, without there being any consciously visible
difference between those trials in which the cue and the target fell
within the same rectangle and those in which they fell within different
rectangles. And yet the effect of the attention-directing cue on the
reaction times of their participants were different in these different
cases. The attention-directing cues in Norman, Heywood and
Kentridge’s experiment therefore seem to draw attention to a region
the boundaries of which are defined by the unseen rectangles. They do
so in such a way as to facilitate the processing of items that occur
within those boundaries. In such a case there is no sense in denying
that attention is paid to the unseen rectangles. This is, therefore, a
counter-example to the claim that one must be conscious of a thing in
order to pay attention to it. It establishes the falsity of .
3. Consequences of Rejecting 
Norman, Heywood and Kentridge’s (2013) experiment is bad news
for the claim that my 2008 paper took to be a natural one. It is also bad
news for the theory of attention proposed by Smithies.
Smithies claims that ‘Attention is what makes information fully
accessible for use in the rational control of thought and action’ (Smith-
ies, 2011, p. 248). His article starts by taking this functional role to be
essential to attention. The goal of the article is to derive a claim about
attention’s relation to consciousness from there. Smithies makes the
claim just quoted as a claim about the functional role that attention
has, essentially and fundamentally. He is not making a claim about
one function that attention just happens to fulfil. The ‘is’ of his claim
is intended as the ‘is’of identity. But the attention elicited by the cue in
Norman, Heywood and Kentridge’s experiment shows this identity
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claim to be false. Contrary to what Smithies’ claim would entail, the
participants in Norman, Heywood and Kentridge’s experiment have
no rational access to the rectangles to which they are attending. If it
happened that there was something about the experience of these
experimental stimuli that prompted the subjects to form a belief about
rectangles having been present on the screen, that belief could only be
a hunch or a guess. The attention that is paid to these rectangles cannot
make any beliefs that are formed about them into rational ones. Nor
does attention to the rectangles make the information about those rect-
angles ‘fully-accessible’. The rectangles remain invisible, even when
attention is being paid to them. Smithies’ rational-access view of
attention is therefore refuted by the Norman, Heywood and Kentridge
(2013) experiment.
The news is almost as bad for Watzl. Since attention can be paid to
the rectangles in Norman, Heywood and Kentridge’s experiment, and
since these do not feature in the contents of consciousness (and so
cannot possibly participate in any conscious peripherality relation),
Watzl’s (2011) theory of the way in which attention imposes a peri-
pherality structure on the contents of consciousness cannot tell us
about the essence of attention. It gets no grip on the attention paid by
Norman, Heywood and Kentridge’s participants, and so cannot be a
complete account of what attention is.
The problem here is not just that Norman, Heywood and
Kentridge’s experiment reveals an awkward counter-example, which
these philosophical theories might be adapted to accommodate. The
problem, as we have already indicated, is that the result of their exper-
iment reveals the explanatory project that these theorists are
embarked on to be a misbegotten one. The possibility of attention
being paid to unseen objects is a problem for any theory that attempts
to account for attention by specifying the circumstances in which con-
sciousness comes to have an attended foreground. Any variation on
the themes that Watzl and Smithies have established will be vulnera-
ble to some version of this same problem. If there is attention without
consciousness, as the Norman, Heywood and Kentridge (2013) exper-
iment indicates, then attending cannot be any particular way of being
conscious, however carefully the way in question might be specified.
We started by outlining two explanatory strategies, no more than one
of which could be correct: Smithies and Watzl pursued the conscious-
ness-first strategy in their explanations of attention; Prinz pursued the
attention-first strategy in his explanation of consciousness. We have
now seen that, so far as the debate about our claim  is concerned, it is
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Watzl and Smithies whose explanatory project seems to be in trouble.
Prinz’s explanatory strategy is not threatened by the falsity of .
Prinz’s own way of pursuing that strategy does, however, face a
problem.
This problem arises because Prinz’s attention-based explanation of
consciousness is one in which attention is understood to essentially
involve the projection of sensory information into working memory.
He is quite explicit about this, writing that: ‘attention can be identified
with the processes that allow information to be encoded in working
memory’ (Prinz, 2012, p. 93). The Norman, Heywood and Kentridge
(2013) experiment undermines this identification.
The participants in that experiment are, as we have said, paying
attention to one or other of the invisible rectangles. If Prinz’s account
of attention were correct then a process would need to be taking place
that allows information about that particular rectangle to be encoded
in working memory. But there is no reason to suppose that information
about the rectangles is stored in any sort of memory at all. There is no
reason to suppose that it is stored beyond the time when the rectangles
are perceptually present. Nor is there any evidence that any sort of
executive ‘work’ is devoted to the information pertaining to one of
these rectangles in particular: the subjects in Norman, Heywood and
Kentridge’s experiment are not even disposed to guess that the rectan-
gles are present. When they do make guesses about the presence of
these rectangles, there is no information about the rectangles in the
guesses that they make (ibid., Fig. 2b). There is therefore no indica-
tion that any process is taking place that allows information about one
of these rectangles to be encoded in working memory. The attention
that is paid in Norman, Heywood and Kentridge’s study seems to be
an instance of attention that has no connection to working memory at
all.
Norman, Heywood and Kentridge’s findings do not require the
abandonment of Prinz’s theory when that theory is being understood
— without reference to attention — as a theory of the way in which
consciousness is related to the information processing taking place in
the brain. Prinz can retain the central claim of his AIR theory, which is
that consciousness occurs when ‘intermediate-level’ representations
are sent to working memory (see Prinz, 2012, p. 293). The Norman,
Heywood and Kentridge experiment gives no counter-example to
that, since the unseen objects in that experiment are defined by bound-
aries of visual texture, and so are not objects that have been repre-
sented at the intermediate level, in Prinz’s sense of ‘intermediate’.
Prinz’s theory of consciousness is not threatened by the Norman,
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Heywood and Kentridge (2013) finding, but his theory of attention is.
That finding gives a counter-example to Prinz’s claim that ‘attention
can be identified with the processes that allow information to be
encoded in working memory’, and so undermines Prinz’s suggestion
that, in giving his ‘AIR’ theory, he is giving an attention-based theory
of consciousness.
This is only a superficial blow to Prinz’s project. Prinz advertises
the AIR theory as an account of ‘how attention engenders experi-
ence’, but he has suggested that he would be willing to give up the
word ‘attention’, if it misrepresents his working-memory based the-
ory of consciousness (Prinz, 2012, p. 95). The Norman, Heywood and
Kentridge (2013) finding shows that he would be right to do so.
4. Attention and Agency
If the prospects are bad for Prinz-style theories, in which conscious-
ness is explained with reference to attention, and for Smithies-and-
Watzl-style theories, in which attention is explained with reference to
consciousness, then the way is open for a theory in which these two
phenomena are taken to be independent. Such a theory can still be
made compatible with the idea that attention is intimately related to
processes in which consciousness is typically involved. It need only
maintain that this relation to consciousness is owing to a contingent
feature of our psychology. My own work gives such a theory of atten-
tion (Mole, 2011). The attention/consciousness link is also taken to be
inessential in the selection for action theory of attention, which has
recently been reanimated in the work of Wayne Wu (2014; 2011;
Allport, 1987; Neumann, 1987).
In these theories, attention is seen as being essentially connected to
the exercise of agency, in a broad sense of ‘agency’, which is applica-
ble to any creature that has and uses a will. According to Wu’s theory,
a subject is paying attention just in case she is navigating through the
space of possible bodily and mental actions that are currently avail-
able to her, rather than drifting through that space at random. Accord-
ing to my own theory — in which attention is identified with
‘cognitive unison’ — an agent is doing something attentively only if
she is doing something under the guidance of her understanding of
that thing (and only if the resources that she can bring bear, as part of
her current attempt to do the thing, are not occupied with processing
of a sort that is irrelevant to her attempt). In neither theory is attention
primarily a phenomenon of conscious experience. Attention involves
experience only to the extent that the world we experience is a world
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in which we act (where, again, ‘action’ is construed broadly, and
includes such epistemic actions as inspecting, surveying, or
reasoning).
There are some immediate advantages to this breaking of the con-
nection between attention and consciousness.
The first is that it allows for the literal truth of sentences in which
attention is attributed to unconscious entities, as when we say that the
Manchester United football team paid more attention to defence in the
first half of the game, and more attention to attack in the second, or
that it paid more attention to the FA Cup in the 1980s, and more atten-
tion to the Champion’s League in the 1990s. It is plausible that such
claims require us to think of that whole football team as being an
agent, capable of doing things (such as winning leagues) that are not
just the several actions of its several members. Taking such claims to
be literally true does not require us to think — what would be much
more problematic — that the team constitutes a single emergent sub-
ject of conscious experiences, additional to the experiences of its con-
stituent members. That is an indication that our attributions of
attention attribute a phenomenon of agency, and not of consciousness.
A further advantage of breaking the link between attention and con-
sciousness is that it allows for there to be true claims about attention
over timescales where the attribution of any particular phenomenol-
ogy would seem to be misplaced. We may want to allow that it can be
literally true that a person started attending to her career in her twen-
ties, having been attending to other things in her teens. Such a claim
would tell us about the way in which this agent structured the execu-
tion of her projects over these decades, not about any decade-long ten-
dencies in her phenomenal experience. Again the facts about attention
seem most fundamentally to be facts about agency, not facts about
conscious experience (although they do, of course, have implications
that relate to conscious experiences, when the agent in question is a
conscious one).
An anonymous referee for this journal complains that ‘the use of
the term “attention” with respect to the behaviour of football teams or
career advancement is very different from its use elsewhere’. This ref-
eree therefore takes the arguments of the previous two paragraphs as
spurious. It is true that these examples have a different character from
the previous ones, but I do not think that they are cases in which the
word ‘attention’ is used with a different sense. To introduce these
examples to the discussion is not to change the subject (as it would be
if I were suggesting that our theory of attention should apply not only
to the focusing of mental resources but also to the posture of the
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soldier who is about to present arms). I suppose — as an axiom of
philosophical methodology — that our theory of attention should, if
possible, be a theory of the phenomenon referred to by the English
word ‘attention’. If that is right then our theory should apply to the full
range of cases. To broaden our diet of examples is not to change the
subject. The anonymous referee is no doubt right that the psychologi-
cal processes that are involved in these last examples are different
from the psychological processes that are involved in the 200 ms-long
instances of attention that are studied in typical laboratory experi-
ments, including those that we have been considering above, but it
would be a mistake to suppose that, since different processes are
involved in these different instances of ‘attention’, the word ‘atten-
tion’ must be being used with a different sense when we refer to them.
To suppose that would be to beg the larger question (considered at
length in Mole, 2011), by supposing that ‘attention’ is a process-first
term, and not an adverbial one.
Attention has not, traditionally, enjoyed a place alongside conscious-
ness, free will, or intentionality, on the list of those features of the
mind that resist scientific explanation, and that therefore demand
philosophical scrutiny. It is partly as a result of this that the theory of
attention has become one of the most thoroughly achieved theories in
cognitive psychology’s picture of the mind. It is understandable that
philosophers have hoped that theory could be put to philosophical
work. And — it being the received wisdom that ‘Consciousness is
what makes the mind body problem really intractable’ (Nagel, 1974)
— it is understandable that these philosophers have hoped the theory
of attention would be related in some way to the theory of conscious-
ness. The above considerations suggest that that hope is mistaken. The
theory of attention may indeed have philosophical work to do, but
attention is more intimately related to the mysteries of agency than to
the mysteries of consciousness. Getting clear on the proper relation-
ships between these mysteries — on how many of them there are, and
on which are more basic than the others — will be an essential step
towards their eventual solution.1
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